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Abstract:  
 This paper examines the relationship between the sustainability level and tax evasion and tests 
whether the level of corruption moderates such a relationship. Tax evasion is measured using 
the macro indirect approach based on Schneider, Buehn and Monterngro (2010). Sustainability 
level and corruption variable are collected from The Global Competitiveness Report for 2012-
2013. Based on a sample of 65 developed and developing countries, we find that the level of 
tax evasion is negatively associated with the level of sustainability (overall score and social and 
environmental score) and the quality of infrastructure. When we distinguish between low- and 
high-corruption countries, we find that this negative association is significant for low-
corruption countries and insignificant for high-corruption settings. These results imply that the 
level of corruption may reduce the tendency of individuals in a given state to accept and trust 
their government in general and comply with the tax rules in particular. Our empirical findings 
have policy implications for governments with high levels of tax evasion since they highlight 
the importance of states’ engagements towards their citizens in reducing the tax evasion. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although audits and fiscal authorities’ controls exist, tax evasion1 represents a widespread 
phenomenon for both developed and developing countries that may considerably affect public 
revenues due to the lack of tax compliance (Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006).  Understanding 
the determinants of tax evasion is crucial for governments that seek to reduce the level of tax 
evasion in society (Richardson, 2008). 
 Given this importance, this topic has been gaining major interests in tax literature during the 
last decade (e.g., Alm and Torgler, 2006; Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006; Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004; Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2008; Tsakumis, Curatola and Porcano, 2007). These 
studies have considered several variables to explain tax evasion including demographic, legal 
and behavioral characteristics.  
A tax system is a social contract that promises citizens that in exchange for participating in the 
economy by paying taxes, government will finance the overall state welfare (Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004).  Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) suggests that future research may expand the determinants to 
include social and environmental norms in order to contribute to an efficient public policy on 
the topic. Our empirical investigation is further motivated by the recent literature review 
conducted by Khlif and Achek (2014) that summarises the cross-country empirical studies 
dealing with the determinants of tax evasion. In their review, they explicitly call for an empirical 
investigation of the effect country’s level of social and environmental sustainability on tax 
evasion since tax compliance is a type of social contract between government and its citizens. 
However, there is no study, to date, that examines the effect of country’s sustainability level on 
tax evasion. Our paper replies to these research calls and fills an important research gap in the 
                                                 
1 Tax evasion is defined as a behavior involving a direct violation of fiscal rules to escape the payment of tax 
(Richardson, 2008). The deliberate under-reporting of income and over-claiming of tax deductions are examples 
of tax evasion (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), 2001, 134).  
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literature by being the first to examine the impact of sustainability level on tax evasion. We also 
examine whether the level of corruption affects the sustainability-tax evasion relationship. 
 
Using a sample of 65 developed and developing countries, the level of tax evasion is negatively 
associated with the level of sustainability (overall score and social and environmental score) 
and the quality of infrastructure. When we distinguish between low- and high-corruption 
countries, we find that this negative association is significant for low-corruption countries and 
insignificant for high-corruption countries.  These results imply that the level of corruption may 
reduce the tendency of individuals in a given state to accept and trust their government in 
general and comply with the tax rules in particular (Slemrod, 2002; Slemrod and Katuscak, 
2002). In addition, a high corrupt environment may increase the feeling among citizens that 
they do not owe anything to the government because it does not respect the terms of social 
contract established between them. Our empirical findings have policy implications for 
governments having high levels of tax evasion since they highlight the importance of state’s 
engagement towards its citizens in the reducing of tax noncompliance. 
We offer two major contributions to tax literature. First, the paper is being of the first to examine 
the impact of different sustainability scores on tax evasion. Second, we are also the first to 
examine the extent to which corruption level may affect the association between sustainability 
and tax evasion. These findings have policy implications for governments that seek to reduce 
the level of tax evasion. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops theoretical bases for the 
association between sustainability and tax evasion and formulates research hypotheses. Section 
3 describes the research design. Section 4 summarizes and analyzes the empirical results of this 
study. Section 5 presents the conclusions, limitations and future research avenues. 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
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2.1. Sustainability level and tax evasion 
 
A tax system in a country is considered as social contract between taxpayers and their state. 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004, p. 137) defines tax system as “… is a special social contract whereby 
individuals in a given state accept and trust their government in general, and comply with the 
tax burden in particular, if the government and/or the state provide them with conditions that 
enhance and protect their human dignity, trigger their morality and respect for moral norms, 
and assure them a piece of mind in their relations with other citizens and in the conduct of their 
affairs”. The level of sustainability can take several forms including the protection of 
environment, the reduction of poverty, the improvement the quality of life and the quality of 
infrastructure.    
Based on these suggestions, we expect that a strong government commitment to increase the 
welfare in a country through social, environmental sustainability and the quality of 
infrastructure may encourage taxpayers to comply with tax legislation which implies low tax 
evasion level. By contrast, if citizens in a country do not receive in exchange with their 
compliance with tax rules a sufficient level of sustainability, this will discourage them to pay 
taxes. This implies that this country does not respect the social contract established with its 
citizens which translates into high level of tax non-compliance and thus high levels of tax 
evasion.  
Based on legitimacy theory, we suggest that the commitment of one state to improve the overall 
welfare of one country represents a legitimacy signal for citizens in general and taxpayers in 
particular.  Therefore, the state’s sustainability effort may represent a signal for taxpayers 
showing the degree of commitments of governments towards their citizens. When taxpayers 
feel that their government does not make a transparent allocation of fiscal revenues; this might 
discourage them to comply with fiscal rules.  
 6 
Prior empirical studies dealing with the determinants of tax evasion suggest that several factors 
may affect this variables including demographic variables (Richardson, 2006), cultural 
dimensions (Gabor, 2012; Richardson, 2008; Tsakumis, Curatola and Porcano, 2007), legal and 
economic variables (Riahi-Belkoui, 2004; Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006). A neglected aspect 
in tax evasion literature is the effect of sustainability effort undertaken by government on tax 
evasion.  Accordingly, we build on these studies and expand them to explore how the level of 
sustainability in a country can affect taxpayers’ behavior through tax evasion.  Accordingly, it 
is expected that a high level of sustainability in one country will encourage citizens to comply 
strongly with tax rules and reduce the likelihood of tax evasion. We consider four levels of 
sustainability and set the following hypotheses: 
H1: The level of overall sustainability is negatively associated with the level of tax evasion. 
H2:  The level of environmental sustainability is negatively associated with the level of tax 
evasion. 
H3: The level of social sustainability is negatively associated with the level of tax evasion. 
H4: The quality of infrastructure is negatively associated with the level tax evasion.  
2.2. The moderating effect of corruption on the association between sustainability and tax 
evasion 
Corruption is defined as the exercise of public power to private gain (Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2006).  Corruption involves an operation in which one agent typically pays a sum of money or 
performs a service in exchange for an illicit act by a public official (Andreoni, Erard and 
Feinstein, 1998). High level of corruption, in a given country, is likely to reduce the tendency 
of individuals to accept and trust their government in general and comply with the tax burden 
in particular (Slemrod, 2002; Slemrod and Katuscak, 2002). In addition, a high corrupt 
environment may increase the feeling among citizens that they do not owe anything to the 
government because it does not do anything for them (McGee, 1999b). 
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Corruption may also reduce the sustainability effort made by government. For instance, Morse 
(2006) provides evidence that level of corruption reduces environmental sustainability. By 
reducing the level of corruption, government may increase the value of sustainability effort and 
increase the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, this is referred as tax morale motivation (Frey, 
1994, 1997a, b). Therefore, we try to explore how the level of corruption may moderate the 
association between the level of sustainability and tax evasion. Based on the above discussion, 
we expect that the negative association between sustainability and tax evasion will be more 
significant for countries characterized by low corruption level. Thus, we set the following 
hypothesis: 
H5: The negative association between sustainability effort (overall, environmental, social and 
the quality of infrastructure) is more (less) pronounced in settings characterized by low (high) 
corruption level.  
3. Research design 
In this study we consider four sustainability dimensions and we test their effects on tax evasion 
for a sample of 65 developed and developing countries. These sustainability dimensions are 
classified into four categories including an overall sustainability score, environmental 
sustainability score, social sustainability score and the quality of infrastructure. Data for this 
study are collected from a public range of public sources. Appendix 1 provides a description of 
the data employed to measure the different variables used and their various sources.  
3.1. Sample 
The sample for this study consists of 65 countries. The justice tax network reports the cost of 
tax abuse for 145 countries, while the Global competitiveness report (2012 -2013) includes 
sustainability scores only for 79 countries. Thus, we limit our analysis to 79 countries that have 
sustainability scores in the Global Competitiveness Report. We also exclude four countries 
because there is no information about them in the Justice Tax Network.  Finally, since we 
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control for cultural dimensions, we exclude 10 countries with no cultural scores. Based on these 
criteria, our final sample encompasses 65 countries.  Table 1 presents the sample selection 
process and the list of countries included in our sample. 
Insert table 1 about here 
3.2. Dependent variable: Tax evasion 
Tax evasion literature distinguishes between micro-direct and macro-indirect approaches 
(Gemmell and Hasseldine, 2012). While micro direct approaches are based on taxpayer data or 
surveys or tax audit to measure the extent of tax noncompliance, macro direct approaches 
estimate the size of the hidden economy based on macro-economic assumptions and models. 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui (2006), Richardson (2006) and Richardson 
(2008) use the individuals’ perceptions about tax evasion as a proxy for a country’s tax evasion 
reported by the World Competitiveness Reports. By contrast, Tsakumis et al. (2007) and Gabor 
(2012) use the macro indirect approach. This approach is based on the economic estimate of 
shadow economy developed by Schneider (2004) using dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-
causes (DYMIMIC)2  which consists of a structural equations model with one unobserved 
variable named the size of the shadow economy. In this study, we use a macro indirect approach 
based on Schneider, Buehn and Monterngro (2010)3. Table 2 reports the estimates of shadow 
economy in percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the list of countries included in 
our sample. The minimum value for tax evasion is for Switzerland (8.500 %), while the 
maximum value is for Peru (58 %). The median value for tax evasion is for Slovenia (26.200 
%).  
 
                                                 
2 For more details about this approach, see Gemmell and  Hasseldine (2012, pages 213 to 214). 
3 The size of shadow economy is defined as: All market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately 
concealed from public authorities.  
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Insert table 2 about here 
3.3. Independent variables 
The Global Competitiveness Report for 2012-2013 defines sustainability as the set of 
institutions, policies, and factors that make the country competitive over a long period while 
ensuring environmental and social sustainability. Accordingly, we consider the overall 
sustainability score for each country and sub-scores for social and environmental sustainability. 
The Global Competitiveness Report considers three indicators for environmental sustainability 
including the environmental policy, the use of renewable resources and degradation of 
environment. The report considers also three indictors for social sustainability including the 
access for basic necessities, vulnerability to shocks and social cohesion4. Finally, we consider 
the quality of infrastructure for each country. All these variables are measured using a survey 
among a sample of individuals from each country raging from 1 for low level of sustainability 
and low quality of infrastructure to 7 for high level of sustainability and high quality of 
infrastructure. Table 3 shows the sustainability scores for countries included in our analysis 
Insert table 3 about here 
The minimum values for sustainability are obtained for Pakistan with 2.900, 2.960 and 2.840 
for the overall, environmental and social sustainability scores respectively, whereas the 
maximum values are for Switzerland and they account for 6.850, 6.870 and 6.830 respectively 
for the overall, environmental and social sustainability scores. With regard to the quality of 
infrastructure, the maximum value is for Germany (6.400), while the minimum value is 
obtained for Tanzania (2.300).  
3.4. The moderating variable: the level of corruption 
                                                 
4 For more details for these indicators, have a look at the Global Competitiveness Report (2012-2013), figure 2  for 
environmental sustainability indicators and figure 3 for social sustainability indicators pages 54 and 55 respectively.  
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The importance of corruption in one economy may affect the level of sustainability (Morse, 
2006) and tax evasion (Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006). In our study, the level of corruption is 
measured as the he weight of corruption as the most problematic factor in doing business (a 
percentage). From a list of 16 factors including corruption, respondents were asked to select the 
five most problematic and rank them from 1 (most problematic) to 5. The results were then 
tabulated and weighted according to the ranking assigned by respondents.  
3.5. Control variables 
Based on the previous empirical literature dealing the determinants of tax evasion, we consider 
economic, cultural and legal and institutional variables. With respect to economic variables, 
Quirk (1997) suggests that countries in the early stages of economic development represent 
fertile grounds for tax evasion. Similarly to Richardson (2008), our proxy for economic 
development is the GDP per capita. In addition, Gabor (2012), Tsakumis et al. (2007) and 
Richardson (2008) suggest that cultural dimensions may also affect the level of tax evasion in 
one country. Therefore, we consider the following four dimensions including uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, masculinity and power distance5. Finally, we control for legal and 
institutional characteristics by considering the level of market development (Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004), tax regulation complexity (Richardson, 2006) and legal system (common/civil law 
countries) (Richardson, 2008). Definition of each variable and the source of data used to collect 
information are also provided in Appendix 1.  
 
3.6. Models specification  
                                                 
5 Pragmatism and indulgence are not considered in the analysis since scores for these dimensions are not reported for several 
countries included in our sample. Besides, Gabor (2012) does not provide support for the significant effect of these cultural 
dimensions on tax evasion.  
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To assess the empirical validity of the hypotheses formulated above, the following OLS6 
regressions are estimated. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity between sustainability 
scores and the quality of infrastructure, each variable is tested separately.  Accordingly, the 
following regression models are performed:     
iiti
itiiiiiii
LGSMAS
UAPDIDCTRCORMKSGDPOSSTEV




109
876543210
                                                                                            
iiti
itiiiiiii
LGSMAS
UAPDIDCTRCORMKSGDPESSTEV




109
876543210
iiti
itiiiiiii
LGSMAS
UAPDIDCTRCORMKSGDPSSSTEV




109
876543210
iiti
itiiiiiii
LGSMAS
UAPDIDCTRCORMKSGDPQISTEV




109
876543210
 
Where: 
 
Dependent variable: 
TEV = level of tax evasion as proxied by the size of shadow economy;  
 
Test variables: 
OSS = overall sustainability score; 
ESS = environmental sustainability score; 
SSS = social sustainability score;  
QIS = quality of infrastructure score;  
Moderating variable: 
COR  = the level of corruption in one country; 
 
Control variables: 
GDP= gross domestic product per capita; 
MKS = market size;  
CTR = complexity of tax regulation;  
ID = individualism score for country i;  
PD = power distance score for country i; 
UA= uncertainty avoidance score for country i; 
MAS = masculinity score for country i; 
LGS = a dummy variable:  1 for common law countries and 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
6 Previous empirical literature dealing with this topic (Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 
2006; Richardson, 2008; Tsakumis, Curatola and Porcano, 2007) suggest the use of OLS regression models. 
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4.7. Testing for the moderating effect of corruption level 
In order to test hypothesis H5 which posits that the level of corruption may moderate the 
association between sustainability effort and tax evasion, we divide our overall sample into two 
sub-samples: (i) countries characterized by a low level of corruption (inferior or equal to the 
median of COR7) and (ii) countries with high level of corruption (superior to the median). A 
test of hypothesis H5 consists of observing a negative and significant association between 
sustainability effort and tax evasion for low corruption countries, while we expect a non-
significant or less significant relationship between sustainability effort and tax evasion for high 
corruption countries. This means that we regress the above four models for low and high 
corruption groups.  
5. Empirical results and analysis 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are reported in table 4. For the dependent variable, tax evasion has a 
mean of 26.592 % and a range from 8.500 % to 58 %. Regarding the sustainability scores, OSS 
has a mean of 4.534 and a range from 2.900 to 6.850, ESS has a mean of 4.494 and a range 
from 2.960 to 6.870, SSS has a mean of 4.575 and a range from 2.840 to 6.830 and QIS has a 
mean of 4.556 and a range from 2.300 to 6.400. The largest standard deviation is obtained for 
SSS and it accounts for 1.059.  
With respect to corruption level, the mean of this variable amounts to 8.104 % and ranges from 
0 % to 20.800 %. The zero value for corruption indicates that no respondents to the survey 
conducted by the world economic forum consider corruption as the most problematic factors for 
doing business. This value is obtained for Australia and New Zealand, while the maximum value is 
obtained for Kenya.  With regard to the complexity of tax regulation and the degree to which 
                                                 
7 The median of corruption in our sample accounts for 7.100. 
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such a factor may represent the most problematic factor for doing business, the mean is about 
7.244 % and ranges from a minimum value of 0.600 % for Trinidad and Tobago to a maximum 
value of 20.400 % for Poland.  
With respect to cultural dimensions, individualism has a mean of 46.076 and a range from 8 to 
91, power distance has a mean of 57.015 and a range from 11 to 100, uncertainty avoidance has 
a mean of 65.015 and a range from 13 to 100 and masculinity has a mean of 48.430 and a range 
from 5 to 100. Finally, 32.307 % of countries included in the analysis belong to common law 
legal system.  
Insert table 4 about here 
5.2. Univariate analysis 
 
Table 5 reports the results of univariate analysis. Findings show that there are a number of 
significant correlations between tax evasion and the overall sustainability score (-0.674), the 
environmental sustainability score (-0.623), the social sustainability score (-0.689) and the 
quality of infrastructure (-0.682). These univariate results provide some preliminary support for 
H1, H2, H3 and H4. In addition, it seems that corruption is significantly and positively associated 
with tax evasion with a Pearson coefficient accounting for 0.592. Finally, individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance are positively associated with tax evasion, while masculinity is 
negatively correlated with the same variable.  
It should be noted here that the sustainability scores (OSS, ESS, SSS and QIS) are highly 
correlated and corruption level is negatively and significantly associated with these 
sustainability scores with Pearson correlations accounting for -0.718, -0.672, -0.736 and         -
0.724 respectively.  
Insert table 5 about here 
 
5.3. Multivariate analyses 
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Table 6 reports the results from estimating the multiple regressions specified in models (1), (2), 
(3) and (4).  In model 1, our finding provides evidence that the overall sustainability score is 
negatively associated with tax evasion (Coeff = 4.271; t = -2.290). This result suggests that the 
higher the sustainability effort in one country, the higher the taxpayers’ compliance with fiscal 
rules.   
With respect to control variable, the level of corruption is positively and significantly associated 
with tax evasion (Coeff = 0.531; t = 2.180). This result is in line with that previously reported 
by Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui (2006). In addition, masculinity has a significant negative effect 
on the same variable (Coeff = -0.137; t = -2.660). This result is also in line with those reported 
by Tsakumis et al. (2007), Richardson (2008) and Gabor (2012). Controlling for 
muticollinearity, the VIFs reported suggest that model 1 does not suffer from such a problem 
since the maximum VIF accounts for 3.270. Finally, the overall explanatory power of the model 
is significantly high (F = 8.400; p < 0.001) and the adjusted-Rsquare accounts for 53.610 %.  
Model 2 considers the environmental sustainability score instead of the overall score. Results 
do not show a significant change since environmental sustainability is negatively associated 
with tax evasion (Coeff = -3.521; t = -1.810). Similarly, corruption level is positively associated 
with tax evasion, while masculinity is negatively associated with the same variable. This model 
does also suffer from multicolliniarity since all VIFs are inferior to 2.830. The explanatory 
power of the model has witnessed a slight decrease moving from 53.610 % in model 1 to 52 % 
in model 2.  
Model 3 considers the social sustainability score instead of the overall score. Findings show 
that social sustainability score is significantly and negatively associated with tax evasion (Coeff 
= -4.309; t = -2.600). Similarly, corruption level is positively associated with tax evasion, while 
masculinity is negatively associated with the same variable. In addition, this model shows that 
uncertainty avoidance is positively and significantly associated with tax evasion (Coeff = 0.105; 
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t = 1.730). This result is also in line with those reported by Tsakumis et al. (2007), Richardson 
(2008). Model 3 does also suffer from multicolliniarity since all VIFs are inferior to 3.490. The 
explanatory power of the model has witnessed a slight increase since it moves from 53.610 % 
in model 1 to 54.750 % in model 3.  
Finally, model 4 considers the quality of infrastructure as a test variable. Results show that the 
quality of infrastructure in one county is significantly and negatively associated with tax 
evasion (Coeff = -4.725; t = -2.910). Similarly, corruption level and uncertainty avoidance are  
positively associated with tax evasion, while masculinity is negatively associated with the same 
variable. Model 3 does also suffer from multicolliniarity since the maximum VIF accounts for 
3.030. The overall explanatory power of the model is significantly high (F = 9.140; p < 0.001) 
and the adjusted-Rsquare accounts for 55.980 %.  
 
These findings support the view that high a high degree of sustainability and a high 
infrastructure quality imply high tax compliance level and less tax evasion and thus H1 H2, H3 
and H4 are supported. Therefore, a strong government commitment to increase the welfare in a 
country through social, environmental and the quality of infrastructure may encourage 
taxpayers to comply with tax legislation which implies low tax evasion. The findings also 
confirm the views of Cuccia (1994) and Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, and McKee (2001) 
who argue that the combination of economic and non-economic variables leads to a better 
understanding of the tax evasion determinants. 
Insert table 6 about here 
5.4. The moderating effect of corruption on the association between sustainability and tax 
evasion 
To test the moderating effect of corruption level on the relationship between sustainability and 
tax evasion (hypothesis H5), we divide the overall sample into countries characterized by high 
and low corruption. 
 16 
    With respect to the overall sustainability score (table 7, model 1), the relationship is negative 
and significant only for low corrupt environment (Coeff = -8.921; t = -4.240), while it is non-
significant for high corrupt environment (Coeff = -3.467; t = -0.850). This means that low 
corruption level implies more credibility of sustainability effort undertaken by government. 
Taxpayers will have more trust in their government and comply more with fiscal rules. Under 
low corruption level, market size contributes also the reduction of tax evasion (Coeff = -3.960; 
t = -2.510) and legal system (common law countries) is associated with low tax evasion levels 
(Coeff = -10.029; t = -2.640). By contrast, legal system (common law countries) is associated 
with high tax evasion levels under high corruption levels (Coeff = 9.979; t = 2.150). It is worthy 
to note that the overall explanatory power, as proxied by the adjusted R-Square, has witnessed 
a improvement for low corruption countries moving from 53.610 % for the overall sample to 
62.700 % for low corrupt environment, while it decreases for high corrupt environment since it 
amounts to 32.910%. 
  With respect to the environmental sustainability score (table 7, model 2), the relationship is 
negative and significant only for low corrupt environment (Coeff = -7.646; t = -3.380), while it 
is non-significant for high corrupt environment (Coeff = -2.133; t = -0.470). This means that 
low corruption level gives rise to the environmental sustainability effort undertaken by 
government among taxpayer. Under low corruption level, market size contributes also the 
reduction of tax evasion (Coeff = -3.990; t = -2.480) and legal system (common law countries) 
is associated with low tax evasion levels (Coeff = -9.633; t = -2.290). By contrast, legal system 
(common law countries) and uncertainty avoidance are associated with high tax evasion levels 
under high corruption levels (Coeff = 10.159; t = 2.170) and (Coeff = 0.228; t = 2.250), while 
masculinity is negatively associated with tax evasion (Coeff = -0.168; t = -1.860). It should be 
noted here that the adjusted R-Square has witnessed a decrease for high corrupt environment 
since it amounts to 31.410%. 
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 Similarly, corruption level also moderates the association between the social sustainability 
score  and tax evasion since the relationship is negative and significant only for low corrupt 
environment (Coeff = -8.608; t = -4.540), while it is non-significant for high corrupt 
environment (Coeff = -3.740; t = -1.090). This means that a low corrupt environment increases 
the credibility of social sustainability effort undertaken by government and encourages 
taxpayers to comply more with fiscal rules. Under low corruption level, market size and legal 
system are negatively associated with tax evasion, while individualism is positively associated 
with the same variable. By contrast, under high corruption levels, legal system (common law 
countries) and uncertainty avoidance are positively associated with tax evasion, while 
masculinity has a negative effect on the same variable.  Similarly to model 1, the adjusted R-
Square, has witnessed an improvement for low corruption countries moving from 54.750 % for 
the overall sample (model 3) to 64.920 % for low corrupt environment, while it decreases for 
high corrupt environment since it amounts to 34.250%. 
 Finally, the relationship between the quality of infrastructure and tax evasion (table 7, model 
4) is negative and significant for low corrupt environment (Coeff = -7.501; t = -3.480), while it 
is less significant for high corrupt environment (Coeff = -5.502; t = -2.060). This implies that a 
high quality of infrastructure encourages taxpayers to comply more with fiscal rules with a more 
significant effect under low corrupt environment.  Under low corruption level, legal system 
(common law countries) is negatively associated with low tax evasion levels (Coeff = -7.805; t 
= -1.970). Under high corruption level, legal system (common law countries) and uncertainty 
avoidance are positively associated with high tax evasion levels, while masculinity is negatively 
associated with the same variable. The adjusted R-Square witnesses a decrease for high corrupt 
environment since it accounts for 41.900%, while it was about 55.980 % for model 4.  
Overall, it seems that the level of corruption moderates the association between the level of 
sustainability and tax evasion and thus H5 is confirmed. For instance, taxpayers trust more a 
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sustainability effort undertaken by a state operating under a low corrupt environment leading 
to more tax compliance. In addition, the level of corruption moderates the association between 
legal system and tax evasion since tax compliance is higher in common law countries 
characterized by low corruption level. Finally, the effect of cultural dimensions (uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity and individualism) on tax evasion is also moderated by the level of 
corruption.  
Insert table 7 about here 
6. Conclusion 
The determinants of tax evasion on cross-county basis have been gaining major interests in tax 
literature following the pioneering work of Riahi-Belkaoui (2004). A neglected aspect in 
empirical literature is the effect of sustainability effort undertaken by government on tax 
evasion since tax system represents a implicit contract between the individual and the state 
guaranteeing social and environmental welfare in exchange of high tax compliance. 
Accordingly, this study expands this stream of research by examining the effect of the overall,  
social, environmental sustainability and the quality of infrastructure on tax evasion since recent 
international reports (e.g. World Economic Forum) publish figures dealing with sustainability 
efforts in many countries.    
OLS regression analysis shows that the sustainability variables have a significant negative 
effect on tax evasion. Accordingly, a higher sustainability effort undertaken by government in 
one country translates into higher taxpayers’ compliance with fiscal rules. In addition, 
corruption level moderates such an association since the negative and significant association is 
more pronounced in countries characterized by low corruption level.  These results imply that 
a high level of corruption may reduce the tendency of individuals in a given state to accept and 
trust their government in general and comply with the tax rules in particular.  
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These specific insights should help government policy-makers to gain a better understanding 
of the importance of sustainability in a given state as a key determinant of tax evasion 
internationally, and design and implement appropriate strategies to minimize its damaging 
effects. This should lead to improvements in tax revenue collection and allocation by 
governments. Empirical findings, in this study, also alert government about the adverse effect 
of low level of sustainability and corruption on the public revenues due to the lack of tax 
compliance.  The findings are of great value to developing and emerging economies that need 
to reduce the level of corruption in an attempt to create the type of tax morale conducive to both 
tax compliance and economic development. 
 
Our study has a number of limitations. First, the sample size of 65 countries is relatively small, 
which may decrease the reliability of empirical findings. However, this is a common problem 
of cross-country research (e.g. Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2008; 
Tsakumis et al., 2007).  Second, tax evasion is measured using the macro-indirect approach 
while other micro-direct approach exists. However, these alternative measures are not available 
in recent international reports to be integrated in the analysis. Finally, some independent 
variables (corruption, tax regulation) are proxied using survey data measures which raise 
concerns about measurement error. However, the data are collected from reputable sources (e.g 
World Economic Forum) which may reduce this concern.  
Future research on tax evasion may be extended as follows. First, variables relating to sanctions, 
probability of detection and religious beliefs might be analyzed, subject to the availability of 
reliable cross-country data. Second, extending the sample size to study how region 
characteristics moderates the determinants of tax evasion may also improve our understanding 
of the topic.  Finally, using several measures of tax evasion is needed to give rise to the 
robustness of the results, subject also to availability of reliable cross-country data. 
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Appendix 1. Data description and sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
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TEV The size of the shadow economy.  Data on the size of shadow 
economy is collected from a World Bank paper prepared by 
Shneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010). The size of the shadow 
economy is estimated as a percentage of ‘ofﬁcial’ GDP. 
Collected from table. 2 pages 454 
to 456, column country average 
from the paper Schneider et al. 
2010. 
OSS A country survey rating  on a scale raging from 1 for low level of 
overall sustainability to 7 for high level of sustainability 
The Global Competiveness report 
2012-2013 (pages 58-59) 
ESS A country survey rating  on a scale raging from 1 for low level of  
environmental sustainability to 7 for high level of sustainability 
The Global Competiveness report 
2012-2013 (pages 58-59) 
SSS A country survey rating  on a scale raging from 1 for low level of 
social sustainability to 7 for high level of sustainability 
The Global Competiveness report 
2012-2013 (pages 58-59) 
QIS A country survey rating  on a scale raging from 1 for low level of 
quality of infrastructure  to 7 for high level of quality of 
infrastructure 
The Global Competiveness report 
2012-2013 (pages 58-59) 
GDP Gross domestic product  per capita of population in thousands of 
Dollars 
The Tax Justice Network 2011 
(pages 8- 9- 10) 
MKS The size of the national domestic and foreign market in an index 
ranging from 0 to 7. 
The Global Competiveness report 
2012-2013 (Country profiles) 
COR The weight of corruption as the most problematic factor in doing 
business (a percentage). The information is drawn from the 2012 
edition of the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey 
(Survey). From a list of 16 factors, respondents were asked to select 
the five most problematic and rank them from 1 (most problematic) 
to 5. The results were then tabulated and weighted according to the 
ranking assigned by respondents 
The Global Competiveness report 
2012-2013 (Country profiles) 
CTR The weight of tax regulation as the most problematic factor in doing 
business (a percentage). The information is drawn from the 2012 
edition of the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey 
(Survey). From a list of 16 factors, respondents were asked to select 
the five most problematic and rank them from 1 (most problematic) 
to 5. The results were then tabulated and weighted according to the 
ranking assigned by respondents 
The Global Competiveness report 
2012-2013 (Country profiles) 
ID Individualism score  
http://geert-
hofstede.com/countries.html 
PD Power distance score 
UA Uncertainty  avoidance  score 
MAS Masculinity  score 
LGS Legal system (common = 1; civil =0) Stulz and Williamson (2003) 
(Table 1, p. 323 & 324).  
  
 
 
Table 1. Sample description 
Sample selection process 
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Countries included in Shneider, Buehn 
and Montenegro (2010) 
145 
Countries with sustainability scores in 
the Global Competitiveness Report 
79 
Initial sample Minimum (145; 79) = 79 
Countries with sustainability scores not 
reported in Shneider, Buehn and 
Montenegro (2010) 
(4) 
Countries with no cultural dimensions (10) 
Final sample 65 
List of countries included in the analysis 
Argentina  Kenya  
Australia  Latvia  
Austria  Lithuania  
Belgium  Malaysia  
Brazil  Mexico  
Bulgaria  Morocco  
Canada  Namibia  
Chile  Netherlands  
China  New Zealand  
Colombia  Norway  
Costa Rica  Pakistan  
Croatia  Peru 
Czech Republic  Philippines  
Denmark  Poland  
Dominican Republic  Portugal  
Ecuador  Romania  
Egypt  Russian Federation  
Estonia  Slovak Republic  
Finland  Slovenia  
France  South Africa  
Germany  Spain  
Greece  Sri Lanka  
Hungary  Sweden  
Iceland  Switzerland  
India  Tanzania  
Indonesia  Thailand  
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Trinidad and Tobago  
Ireland  Turkey  
Israel  United Kingdom  
Italy  United States  
Jamaica  Uruguay  
Japan  Venezuela  
Jordan    
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Tax evasion by countries 
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Rank from low to high level of shadow economy  
  Country TEV   Country TEV 
1 Switzerland  8.500 34 Italy 27.000 
2 United States  8.600 35 Poland  27.200 
3 Austria  9.700 36 South Africa  27.300 
4 Japan  11000 37 Greece  27.500 
5 New Zealand  12.400 38 Latvia  29.200 
6 United Kingdom  12.500 39 Mexico  30.000 
7 China  12.700 40 Namibia  30.300 
8 Netherlands  13.200 41 Malaysia  30.900 
9 Australia  14.000 42 Estonia  31.200 
10 France  15.000 43 Turkey  31.300 
11 Iceland  15.600 44 Dominican Republic  31.900 
12 Canada  15.700 45 Lithuania  32.000 
13 Ireland  15.800 46 Croatia  32.100 
14 Germany  16.000 47 Ecuador  32.400 
15 Denmark  17.700 48 Romania  32.600 
16 Finland  17.700 49 Kenya  33.200 
17 Slovak Republic  18.100 50 Trinidad and Tobago  33.400 
18 Iran, Islamic Rep.  18.300 51 Venezuela  33.800 
19 Czech Republic  18.400 52 Jamaica  34.800 
20 Jordan  18.500 53 Egypt  34.900 
21 Norway  18.700 54 Morocco  34.900 
22 Sweden  18.800 55 Bulgaria  35.300 
23 Indonesia  18.900 56 Pakistan  35.700 
24 Chile  19.300 57 Colombia  37.300 
25 Belgium  21.900 58 Brazil  39.000 
26 Israel  22.000 59 Philippines  41.600 
27 India  22.200 60 Russian Federation  43.800 
28 Spain  22.500 61 Sri Lanka  43.900 
29 Portugal  23.000 62 Thailand  50.600 
30 Hungary  24.400 63 Uruguay  50.600 
31 Argentina  25.300 64 Tanzania  56.400 
32 Costa Rica  25.800 65 Peru 58.000 
33 Slovenia  26.200       
 Notes: TEV: tax evasion level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Sustainability scores for countries included in the sample 
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Sustainability scores for each country included in the sample 
Country OSS ESS SSS QIS Country OSS ESS SSS QIS 
Argentina  3.480 3.370 3.590 3.600 Kenya  3.380 3.760 3.010 3.100 
Australia  5.460 5.080 5.830 5.700 Latvia  4.620 4.690 4.550 4.100 
Austria  6.020 5.860 6.170 5.800 Lithuania  4.610 4.710 4.520 4.700 
Belgium  5.680 5.460 5.900 5.700 Malaysia  5.140 4.980 5.300 5.100 
Brazil  4.460 4.690 4.220 4.000 Mexico  4.010 3.900 4.120 4.000 
Bulgaria  4.070 3.970 4.170 3.800 Morocco  3.530 3.520 3.550 4.100 
Canada  5.630 5.330 5.930 5.800 Namibia  3.530 3.840 3.220 4.200 
Chile  4.480 4.430 4.530 4.600 Netherlands  6.210 5.880 6.540 6.200 
China  4.440 4.270 4.610 4.500 New 
Zealand  
5.680 5.530 5.820 5.200 
Colombia  3.740 4.010 3.470 3.400 Norway  6.150 5.980 6.320 5.200 
Costa Rica  4.490 4.690 4.300 3.800 Pakistan  2.900 2.960 2.840 2.700 
Croatia  4.020 4.200 3.840 4.700 Peru 3.880 4.030 3.730 3.500 
Czech 
Republic  
4.770 4.660 4.890 4.800 Philippines  3.990 4.160 3.820 3.200 
Denmark  5.730 5.250 6.210 5.700 Poland  4.370 4.420 4.320 3.900 
Dominican 
Republic  
3.290 3.290 3.290 3.000 Portugal  4.360 4.150 4.580 5.500 
Ecuador  3.630 3.670 3.580 3.500 Romania  3.720 3.730 3.710 3.200 
Egypt  3.380 3.200 3.560 3.600 Russian 
Federation  
3.980 3.870 4.090 4.500 
Estonia  4.830 4.850 4.820 4.700 Slovak 
Republic  
4.270 4.360 4.180 4.200 
Finland  6.360 6.260 6.450 5.600 Slovenia  4.660 4.560 4.760 4.900 
France  5.500 5.400 5.590 6.300 South 
Africa  
3.800 3.770 3.830 4.100 
Germany  6.140 5.920 6.370 6.400 Spain  4.550 4.450 4.660 5.900 
Greece  3.710 3.820 3.590 4.700 Sri Lanka  3.960 4.250 3.670 4.100 
Hungary  4.300 4.320 4.290 4.400 Sweden  6.160 6.150 6.170 5.700 
Iceland  5.440 5.430 5.450 5.700 Switzerland  6.850 6.870 6.830 6.200 
India  3.730 3.750 3.700 3.600 Tanzania  3.240 3.600 2.880 2.300 
Indonesia  4.030 4.210 3.850 3.700 Thailand  4.280 4.160 4.390 4.600 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep.  
3.850 3.850 3.850 4.000 Trinidad 
and Tobago  
3.830 3.670 4.000 4.300 
Ireland  5.180 5.110 5.260 5.300 Turkey  4.040 3.840 4.240 4.400 
Israel  5.060 4.720 5.400 4.900 
United 
Kingdom  
5.820 5.620 6.030 6.100 
Italy  4.390 4.400 4.380 5.200 
United 
States  
5.310 5.000 5.630 5.800 
Jamaica  3.510 3.740 3.280 3.600 Uruguay  4.150 4.090 4.210 4.400 
Japan  5.760 5.420 6.100 5.900 Venezuela  3.280 3.410 3.150 2.600 
Jordan  3.920 3.580 4.250 4.200      
Notes: OSS: overall sustainability score; ESS: environmental sustainability score, SSS: social sustainability score; QIS: quality 
of infrastructure score.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
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Variable  Observations Mean Median Standard  
deviation 
Minimuim Maximuim 
TEV 65 26.592 26.200 11.426 8.500  58 
OSS 
65   4.534 4.300   0.944 2.900 6.850 
ESS 
65   4.494 4.270   0.855 2.960  6.870 
SSS 
65   4.575 4.290   1.059 2.840  6.830 
QIS 
65   4.556 4.400   1.014 2.300  6.400 
GDP 
65 59.840 13.061 167.367 1.429 983 
MKS 
65   4.481   4.400    0.984 2.400   6.900 
COR 
65   8.104 7.100    6.760 0.000   20.800 
CTR 
65   7.244 6.500    4.334 0.600   20.400 
ID 
65 46.076 39.000 23.004 8   91 
PD 
65 57.015 60.000 21.026 11   100 
UA 
65 65.015 65.000 21.088 13   100 
MAS 
65 48.430 49.000 21.173 5   100 
LGS 
65   32.307 0.000   47.100 0    1 
Notes: OSS: overall sustainability score; ESS: environmental sustainability score, SSS: social sustainability score; QIS: 
quality of infrastructure score, GDP:   GDP per capita in thousands of Dollars; MKS: market size; COR: corruption level; 
CTR: the level of tax regulation; ID: uncertainty avoidance score; PD: power distance score; UA: Uncertainty avoidance 
score; LGS: dummy variable: 1 if common law country and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5. Correlation matrix 
  TEV OSS ESS SSS QIS GDP MKS COR CTR ID PD UA MAS LGS 
TEV 1.000              
OSS -0.674*** 1.000             
ESS -0.623*** 0.982*** 1.000            
SSS -0.698*** 0.988*** 0.943*** 1.000           
QIS -0.682*** 0.881*** 0.831*** 0.899*** 1.000          
GDP 0.140* -0.192* -0.154* -0.217** -0.259** 1.000         
MKS -0.289* 0.197* 0.138* 0.240** 0.256** -0.136* 1.000        
COR 0.592*** -0.718*** -0.672*** -0.736*** -0.724*** 0.215** -0.111* 1.000       
CTR -0.143* 0.307** 0.332*** 0.279** 0.267** -0.230** 0.277** -0.287** 1.000      
ID -0.596*** 0.710*** 0.681*** 0.716*** 0.704*** -0.144* 0.196* -0.603*** 0.285** 1.000     
PD 0.491*** -0.615*** -0.595*** -0.616*** -0.545*** -0.039 0.140* 0.644*** -0.031 -0.610*** 1.000    
UA 0.227** -0.186* -0.212** -0.160* -0.063 -0.099 0.104* 0.023 0.247** -0.243** 0.215** 1.000   
MAS -0.167* -0.141* -0.157* -0.124* -0.103* -0.027 0.325*** 0.200** -0.038 0.016 0.167* 0.023 1.000  
LGS 0.038 -0.127* -0.124* -0.128* -0.097 0.328*** -0.145* 0.082 -0.385*** 0.053 -0.036 -0.575*** 0.064 1.000 
 
 Notes: TEV: tax evasion level; OSS: overall sustainability score; ESS: environmental sustainability score, SSS: social sustainability score; QIS: quality of infrastructure score, GDP:   GDP 
per capita in thousands of Dollars; MKS: market size; COR: corruption level; CTR: the level of tax regulation; ID: uncertainty avoidance score; PD: power distance score; UA: Uncertainty 
avoidance score; LGS: dummy variable: 1 if common law country and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 6. Multivariate regression analysis 
 
Dependent variable: Tax evasion 
 Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
 
 
 Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic 
Intercept 46.428*** 3.860 43.276*** 3.410 46.335*** 4.170 43.465*** 4.460 
OSS -4.271*** -2.290       
ESS   -3.521* -1.810     
SSS     -4.390*** -2.600   
QIS       -4.725*** -2.910 
GDP -0.022 -0.350 -0.015 -0.240 -0.003 -0.480 -0.004 -0.770 
MKS -1.402 -1.180 -1.732 -1.450 -1.083 -0.910 -1.100 -0.940 
COR 0.531 2.180 0.603  2.490 0.483 1.980 0.465* 1.950 
CTR 0.283 1.040 0.322  1.150 0.226 0.840 0.183 0.690 
ID -0.524 -0.760 -0.068 -0.980 -0.430 -0.630 -0.025 -0.370 
PD 0.176 0.230 0.266 0.350 0.118 0.160 0.031 0.440 
UA 0.101 1.610 0.103 1.600 0.105* 1.730 0.146*** 2.480 
MAS -0.137*** -2.660 -1.33*** -2.550 -0.139*** -2.730 -0.141*** -2.810 
LGS 3.229 1.100 3.502 1.170 3.196 1.110 4.570* 1.650 
  
  
         
F (p-value) 8.400*** 7.940*** 8.740*** 9.140*** 
Adj-R-square 53.610 % 52 % 54.750 % 55.980 % 
Max VIF 3.270 2.830 3.490 3.030 
Number of 
observations 
65 65 65 65 
 Notes: TEV: tax evasion level; OSS: overall sustainability score; ESS: environmental sustainability score, SSS: social sustainability score; QIS: quality of infrastructure score, 
GDP:   GDP per capita in thousands of Dollars; MKS: market size; COR: corruption level; CTR: the level of tax regulation; ID: uncertainty avoidance score; PD: power 
distance score; UA: Uncertainty avoidance score; LGS: dummy variable: 1 if common law country and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7. Multivariate regression analysis 
Dependent variable: Tax evasion 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption 
  Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic 
Intercept 74.533*** 5.450 46.887*** 2.380 68.835*** 4.590 42.912* 1.940 
OSS -8.921*** -4.240 -3.467 -0.850     
ESS     -7.646*** -3.380 -2.133 -0.470 
SSS         
QIS         
GDP -0.010 -0.440 -0.005 -0.700 -0.011 -0.450 -0.004 -0.530 
MKS -3.690*** -2.510 -2.224 -1.240 -3.990*** -2.480 -2.497*** -1.400 
COR         
CTR 0.301 1.130 -0.144 -0.270 0.325 1.110 -0.117 -0.210 
ID 0.157* 1.820 -0.118 -1.080 0.116 1.280 -0.135 -1.240 
PD 0.045 0.490 0.083 0.740 0.079 0.780 0.079 0.680 
UA -0.014 -0.150 0.225*** 2.290 -0.016 -0.160 0.228** 2.250 
MAS -0.006 -0.100 -0.177 -1.990 -0.004 -0.060 -0.168* -1.860 
LGS -10.029*** -2.640 9.979** 2.150 -9.633*** -2.290 10.159** 2.170 
         
         
F (p-value) 6.980 ***  2.690*  5.450***  2.58*  
Adj-R-square       62.700 %  32.910 %  55.500 %  31.410 %  
Max VIF  4.320  2.310  4.360  2.31  
Number of 
observations 33  32  33  32   
Notes: TEV: tax evasion level; OSS: overall sustainability score; ESS: environmental sustainability score, SSS: social sustainability score; QIS: quality of infrastructure score, 
GDP:   GDP per capita in thousands of Dollars; MKS: market size; COR: corruption level; CTR: the level of tax regulation; ID: uncertainty avoidance score; PD: power 
distance score; UA: Uncertainty avoidance score; LGS: dummy variable: 1 if common law country and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7.  Continued 
Dependent variable: Tax evasion 
  Model 3 Model 4 
 Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption 
  Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic 
Intercept 72.001*** 5.740 46.707*** 2.700 52.226*** 4.620 51.594 3.430 
OSS         
ESS         
SSS -8.608*** -4.540 -3.740 -1.090     
QIS     -7.501*** -3.480 -5.202** -2.060 
GDP -0.014 -0.630 -0.006 -0.830 0.001 0.070 -0.010 -1.330 
MKS -3.304** -2.320 -1.920 -1.050 -1.941 -1.180 -2.013 -1.220 
COR         
CTR 0.245 0.950 -0.211 -0.400 -0.082 -0.280 -0.172 -0.350 
ID 0.169** 2.010 -0.108 -1.000 0.160* 1.670 -0.089 -0.890 
PD 0.034 0.380 0.080 0.730 0.149 1.550 0.064 0.620 
UA -0.000 -0.010 0.229*** 2.380 0.063 0.610 0.254*** 2.810 
MAS -0.016 -0.260 -0.179** -2.050 -0.022 -0.310 -0.184 -2.280 
LGS -9.262*** -2.570 9.888** 2.150 -7.805* -1.970 11.298*** 2.620 
         
         
F (p-value) 7.580***  2.790*  5.610***  3.480**  
Adj-R-square          64.900 %  34.250 %  56.400 %  41.900 %  
Max VIF  4.270  2.310  4.230  2.310  
Number of 
observations 33  32  33  32   
Notes: TEV: tax evasion level; OSS: overall sustainability score; ESS: environmental sustainability score, SSS: social sustainability score; QIS: quality of infrastructure score, 
GDP:   GDP per capita in thousands of Dollars; MKS: market size; COR: corruption level; CTR: the level of tax regulation; ID: uncertainty avoidance score; PD: power 
distance score; UA: Uncertainty avoidance score; LGS: dummy variable: 1 if common law country and 0 otherwise. 
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